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Summary findings
In this analytical sequel to A Typology of Foreign  rule. When  bidders  learn such a rule, speculative bidding
Exchange  Auction Markets in Sub-Saharan  Africa, Aron  diminishes.
and Elbadawi compare  the micromanagement  of  *  The management  of a credible, sustainable  reserve
different  foreign exclhange auctions  in Sub-Saharan  price policy requires an efficient  secondnry market.
Africa.  A simple underlying  model, synthesized from the
Multi-unit  auctions  for foreign exchange were  theoretical  literature  on auctions, specifies the auction
introduced  in a number of countries  in tde  1980s and  rate as a function  of fundamental  variables and struccural
199Os, in a transitional  step toward  a credible,  shift dummies. The repeated,  sequential narure of these
sustainable,  unified regime, such as an efficient  interbank  multi-unit  auctions  and the  nonstationary  nature  of most
ma'cet.  But there is little understanding  of how auction  of the auction  variables are captured  empirically by a
markets function  in Sub-Saharan  Africa, and there  has  cointegrated  (error correction)  framework.
been virtually no  research on the causes of frequent  In addition  to consistendy  estimating long-run  and
policy reversals or of auction  failure.  short-run  parameters  of auction  fundamentals,  the error
One possible cause of failure - apart  from  thin  correction  model allows asymptotically  efficient testing
markets,  macroeconomic  laxity, and vulnerability  to  of three  policy hypothcses  deriving from  auction  theory:
terms-of-trade  shocks and  fluctuations  in the  the  competitiveness  hypothesis, the  effect of uncermtinty
disbursement  of foreign aid - is the inappropriate  on the auction-determined  rate, and  the revenue-
design and  management  of auctions.  equivalence hypothesis.
Aron and  Elbadawi estimate  models for the  In other words,  they used these models to test the
microdetermiinants  of the auction  rate,  using weekly data  impact on the level of the auction  rate of increased
on foreign  exchange auctions  for Ghana, Nigeria,  competiton  among  bidders,  of the effect of uncertainty
Uganda, and  Zambia.  Among the poliqc lessons:  (proxied  by a volatile supply of foreign exchange),  and of
N  Nigeria and  Zambia failed to unify and  stabilize the  different  pricing mechanisms  (Dutch and marginal
exchange rate pardy  because there was no reserve price  pricing).
This paper-a  product of the Macroeconomics and Growih Division, Policy  Research  Department-is  part of the departmental
project "Forcign Exchange Auction Markets and Exchange Rare Unification in Sub-Saharan Africa. Copies of this paper are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Raquel Luz, room Ni  1-053,
extension 39059(38 pages). December 1994.
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auctions  .361.  INTRODUCTION
One of the most dramatic manifestations of the economic crisis that swept Sub-Saharan Africa
since the second half of the  1970s, has been the emergence and the subsequent expansion of parallel
markets for foreign exchange.  Relative to other developing regions, the parallel premia and the size of
these markets have tended to be much larger in SSA (Kiguel and O'Connell,  1992). In fact the parallel
premium in most of the Sub-Saharan African countries constitutes a major economic signal reflecting
policy incredibility, therefore influencing short-run as well as long-nm economic decisions (e.g. Aron
and Elbadawi, 1992). It is by now widely  accepted that unifying the exchange rates (official and parallel)
and integrating the parallel market into the regular economy should be a major policy objective for
reforming African countries (e-g. Kiguel and O'Connell,  1992). Recent evidence, however, shows that
achieving exchange rate unification, and more importandy sustaining it, has been a rather elusive goal.'
The received wisdom suggests that the "best" approach to unification might be to start with nominal
devaluations  and gradually liberalize foreign trade transactions - the pace of reform being set by the speed
and credibility of fiscal adjustment (Pinto, 1990). It is also important to emph2size that unification is a
complex process that may require institutional changes as well as behavioral adjustments on the part of
market participants (Agenor and Flood, 1992).
During the 1980s and 1990s, two types of flexible exchange rate regimes have been introduced
in SSA, with one  important goal being the sustainable unification of  multiple markets for  foreign
exchange  These are decentralised interbank markets in foreign exchange,' and the innovative use of
centralised foreign exchange auction markets? Auctions may have advantages over moving directly to
interbank markets where there is insufficient institutional depth to  allow effective functioning of a
decentralized foreign exchange market, where a few commercial banks have historically been dominant
and there is a danger of collusion, or where there are limited sources of foreign exchange (Quirck et al,
1987, Krumm, 1985). The extent of macroeconomic  imbalances (especially  fiscal) that have prevailed in
SSA, and the rudimentary nature of economic instittions  (such as the banking system), provide a strong
case for a more gradualistic approach to exchange rate unification in SSA. Where auctions have proved
'The term unification  in the SSA contxt  rcfers to eradication of the paralld  market However,  since these countries  are
likely to maintain capital controls  in  die medium  term,  there would remain a small role for the parallel makt  in meeting
ponfolio demand. Our conceptof unification in SSA is thus a substntial- reduction of the parallel market so that i. is no longer
a major signal in the economy.
2 Counties which have used interbanic  markets  include Zaire, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana Uganda and Nigeria  (in
tandem with an  auction).
3Countries which have esablished various  types of exchange  rate  auctions include Bolivia  (1985  onwards).  Jamaica  (1984-
89) and African countries,  Ghana (1986.92), Nigeria (198694), Guinea (1986.), Zambia (1985-87),  Sier  Leone (198283),
Uganda (1982-85,  1992-93) and Ethiopia  (1993-).-2
successful in SSA, their primary role has been as a transitional medium towards a unified interbank
market.
Two types of multi-unit foreign exchange auctions have been employed in SSA: first,  retail
auctions, where the bidders are private and public sector importing firms, channelling integrated price-
quantity bids for foreign exchange through the non-competing  banks; and secondly, wholesale auctions,
where the bidders are registered banks or foreign exchange dealers. In the latter case, there may either
be a free secondary (importers') market for foreign exchange, so that banks compete freely in  -the  auction;
or the banks may be restricted to submitting composite bids for foreign exchange which exactly cover
importers' (and possibly their own) requirements in a strictly monitored secondary market. Two types
of pricing mechanisms have been used in these auctions. These are the discriminatory  or Dutch auctions,
where bidders pay their own price for each urit; and competitive  auctions, where bidders pay the lowest
accepted bid price for each unit
The experience with auctions  in SSA has included  some notable successes (e.g. auctions in Ghana
and Uganda); but equally, other countries have experienced damaging speculative episodes and policy
reversals (Nigeria and Zambia). The rather  mixed outcome in  these countries for  unification and
stabilisation  of the exchange rate was discussed in Aron and Elbadawi (1994). The weekly evolution of
the auction rates is illusted  in Figure 1. Although auctions continue to be introduced (e.g. Ethiopia in
1993), and despite the obvious policy importance. the functioning of these markets and the causes of
policy reversals in SSA remains poorly understoodl.  Apart from supply problems due to  initial  conditions
of market thinness and vulnerability to terms of trade shocks and fluctuations in the disbursement of
foreign aid, potential causes of failure include macroeconomic  laxity, inappropriate auction design and
poor micro-management  of auctions. It  is generally accepted that a successfil exchange rate reform
depends crucially on a stable macroeconomic environment. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the
decision to unify exchange rates essentially amounts to a commitment by the authorities to  shift the
nominal anchor from the exchange rate to the money supply. However, the micro-design features of a
foreign exchange auction are more than merely a transmission mechanism  for a sufficiendy sustainable
macro-economic  environment This is because macro-credibility does not only require consistent policy
in terms of fundamentals (fiscal and monetary policy), but also depends crucially on agents' responses
to their perceptions of government  commitment  to reform. Auction design through rules, procedures and
announcements  can modify and direct the bidding behaviour of participating agents.
4 In princ4ile, auctions with limited entry restrictions could provide a  viable, long-term, market-based exchange rate
arrangement. However  in practice, the move to a decentralised  interbank market has been favoured over retaining an auction
for a number of  rmasons: the increased administrative  requirements  of a centalized  auction  system are cosdly; there is greater
potendal for govenmment  mulation  of dte exchange  rate or for rent-seeking; there is a closer association  of the government
to the  politics of the  exchange rate; and furthermore, even with few entry restrictions, the transactions coAts  for auclion
participants particularly  where donor money is being auctioned) creat  a wedge between the parallel and official  market rates.-3-
Unfortunately  there has been virtually no empirical research in this area: part of the reason being
that the analysis  of sequentially  repeated, multi-unit auctions presents substantial theoretical  and empirical
difficulties. The aim of this paper is to build on an earlier institutional and statistical paper on the SSA
auctions (Aron and Elbadawi, 1994), and estimate models for the micro-deterninants of the auction rate,
based on a simple underlying model synthesized  from auction theoretical literature, using weekly foreign
exchange auction data from four Sub-Saharan African countries, Zambia, Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria.
The empirical section of  this paper constitutes a  novel approach to  empirical modelling in  auction
research: in the context of a dynamic model for these repered,  sequential auctions, we employ more
recent econometric techniques of cointegration for efficiert hypothesis testing in the presence of the
regime shifts (structural breaks) which characterize these liberalizadion  episodes in SSA.5 We use this
empirical model to  evaluate some micro-economic design and management features of  the foreign
exchange auctions  through testing policy propositions motivated  by auction theory. We hope to shed some
light on the causes of success and failure of the auction regimes in SSA, and provide a few policy lessons
for improved design and conduct of auctions at the micro-level.
This study is partly historical, but also has substantial current relevance. Two of the countries
we examined  at the time of analysis  had ongoing auctions (Nigeria and Uganda), auctions  were introduced
in Ethiopia in 1993, while more recently the question of introducing an auction to disburse foreign aid
has been mooted in Zambia.' Secondly, there is an increasing tendency to use auctions for the market-
pricing of credit and import quotas in Latin American and Eastern European countries. This trend appears
to be moving  to SSA, so that many of the lessons from the foreign exchange auctions, which take explicit
account of the structural characteristics of these countries, will be transferable.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some analytical issues and gives an
outline of a benchmark model of the auction equilibrium selling rate. Data features and the empirical
methodology  are presented in section 3. The model is estimated in section 4 and various hypotheses are
tested to clarify policy questions, using weekly auction data from Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia and Uganda.
Finally, section 5 concludes with policy lessons from SSA.
5 Regime  shifts and unit-root  are common features of these high firquency SSA data  (Aron and Elbadawi, 1994).
6Further,  a numnber  of Eastern European countnies  employ  foreign exchange  auctions  (eg.  Romania  and Khazakstan)  where
stuctral  characteristics may not be too different in some cases to SSA countries.4-
2.  -THERETICAL  ISSUES
There is currently no single theoretical auction model which adequately  describes the equilibrium
properties of the SSA foreign exchange auctions. A composite of a number o? the existing models is
probably required, and most of the restrictions that are imposed in standard models have to be relaxed.
First, the foreign exchange auctions are multi-unit auctions, which differ from conventional
auctions in that bidders select both the price and the quantity of units they wish to buy at that price. In
contrast to single-unit auctions, the submission of integrated price-quantity bids can involve strategic
behavior on the part of firms, whose payoffs may be raised by downward quantity adjustment under
competitive, though not discriminative  pricing (Tenorio, 1991).
Second, the auctions are not one-shot isolated events, but repeated, sequential auctions. Thus,
they may embody interesting  strategic dynamics and learning behavior, and many predictions from single
auction models will not carry over to repeated auctions (Bikhchandani, 1988). For example, a deception
effect may develop in sequential sales, where if the bidder knows his current bid will reveal information
about later sales, he will have an incentive to underbid (Hausch, 1986). Sequential auctions may also
facilitate cooperative  collusive behavior amongst bidders (applying  the now familiar analysis of repeated
oligopoly games). The issue of commitment  by the seller is important in repeated  auction games (McAfee
and McMillan, 1987), so that we might expect the credibility of the exchange rate liberalization to play
a major role.
Third, and related to the above point, the foreign exchange auctions are not isolated events, but
rather determine an integral price for the whole economy, the exchange rate. The auctions will thus also
be influenced by a combination of macro-economic  policies, exogenous shocks (such as TOT shocks),
and political-economic  features (such as treatment of the large stte-owned sector).
Fourth, bidders may be risk-averse. This is because foreign exchange is a crucial input in often
highly imnport-intensive  production in SSA. Bidders face an uncertain supply of auctionable foreign
exchange, due to thin markets, TOT shocks, and possibly political-economic  factors; and also may be
uncertain about the commitment of the seller to a market-allocation, as opposed to the prior  manual
allocation, of foreign exchange.
Fifth, bidders  may not be symmetric  in these auctions. That is, they may fall into identifiable  sub-
classes, so that instead of there being a single distribution from which bidders draw their valuations as
is usually assumed, there may be more than one distribution. SSA importers constitute an oligopolistic
set, and unquestionably  some bidders are regarded as more credit-worthy. There may also be systematic
production differences between multinational  firms, the domestic private sector and public enterprises.
Sixth, the number of bidders may not be exogenous. The foreign exchange auctions typizally
involve an alteration in the rules over time (for instance, as regards transactions costs, reserve pricing
rules,  or  information revelation), and it has been shown that different rules and formats can attract
different sets of bidders (e.g. Samuelson, 1990).-5  -
Seventh,  the relevant  value  assumptions  (the determinants  of bidders'  payoffs)  and  distributional
assumptions  (the deterninants  of bidders' beliefs  about  their competitors)  probably  imply  a mix of the
two rather different  frameworks  commonly  employed  in auction  models:  the independent  private  values
(IPV)7  and the common  values (CV)9  models.  In the retail auctions,  and in those wholesale  auctions
where purchase  of forex is tied to restricted  imports  and may not be sold in a secondary  market,  the
auctioned  object  is in effect  a proxy for an imported,  intermediate  input  for firms. The IPV component
is due to the different  endowments  and  characteristics  (see  above)  of the competing  firms.  Since  these  are
multiple  unit auctions,  the diminishing  marginal  utility  of the intermediate  good suggests  that  additional
units of forex will also have diminishing  marginal utility for the firm. Further, where the exchange
reform  is expected  to be short-lived,  speculative  behaviour  will also depend  on the privately  observed
opportunity  cost and  endowments  of bidders.  A CV component  may  be injected,  for instance,  when  public
information  is used in making  forecasts,  resulting  in value-correlations;  as well as in genuine  wholesale
auctions  (where  the banks  are not  merely  a channel  for importers'  bids),  since  the bidders'  values  are  then
linked to those in a secondary  market (bureaux  or interbank).  Further, the repeated nature  of these
auctions  means  strategic  behaviour  among  bidders  is likely,  creating  an interdependence  of values;  while
colhl;ion,  tacit or deliberate,  may be facilitated.
A more general  model  has been  developed  which  allows  a bidder's  value  to depend  on his tastes,
those  of other bidders  and of non-participants,  and on unobserved  characteristics  of the auctioned  object
(Milgrom  and Weber, 1982).  The model  embodies  private values and common  values components,  as
well  as a degree  of interdependence  (affiliation)  amongst  bidders'  valuations.  Unfortmately,  most  auction
predictions  stem  from pure IPV or CV models,  and are not worked  out for the general  model.
2.1  Towards an Empirical Model of the Clearing Auction Rate
The predictions  of auction  theory depend  centrally  on the nature  of the underlying  distribution
of bidders' values  of the auctioned  object.  It is clear, therefore,  that a theoretically-consistent  empirical
7The lPV Model cobinesassumptions  of private  values wit  an independentdistbution  of  bidders'  values. Thus, bidders
values  of the auctioned  object are treated as subjective  (diffrences  amongst  bidders  are due to differences in tas),  and while
each bidder  knows  his own  value  with certaint,  he wil  not  know the values  of  other  bidders.  The  IPV  model will not  be
applicable in auctions  where there is a resale muarket  depencling on the tastes of others; nor where- the object embodies  certain
discoverable  but as yet  unknown  properties.  The model would  apply for  the case of  a finn  bidding  for  inputs,  where  all the
characteristics  of the input are known.  Value differences  will then be due only to such factors as differences  in transport costs,
product  mix, capacity  and inventory  consideradons,  opporunity  cost and resource  differences amongst  the bidding  firms.
'The CV model adopts  te  polar opposite  of the private-values  hypothesis:  the auctioned object has some true value which
is conmon but unknown to all bidders. Each bidder independenly estimates  the true value of the auctioned  object  If the bidders
are treated as having symmetric information, and  their estimates are unbiased, these estmates  will represe  independent
drawings  from a probability distribution  with a mean equal to the true value- This model is typically applied in minral  rights
auctions, where there is considerable  uncertainty about the true valuc of the mineral, and common value elements prbably
dominate any private value components.-6  -
methodology  that attempts to estimate  structural  models  of auctions must involve  as a first step the
estimation  of the values  distribution.  However,  even  for the simpler  auction  models,  where  it may  prove
possible  to ascertain  the nature  of the values  distribution,  there are considerable  difficulties  in estimating
structural econometric  models derived from auction theory, given the extreme non-linearities  and
numerical  complexity.  Recent work employs  advanced  econometric  methods  to surmount  some of the
empirical  problems  in order to estimate  structural  models  of auctions  (e.g. Lafbont  et al, 1991;  Laffont
and Vuong, 1992;  Paarsh, 1992;  Gallant  and Taucheri,  1992): Laffont  et at (1991)  use a simulation
approach  to derive  the econometric  model  directly  from the underlying  theoretical  model,  first estimating
the distribution  of private  values  held by bidders.  These methods  are computationally  feasible  where  the
equilibrium  bid has an explicit  form; but it is not clear  that the method  can be easily  generalized  to more
complex  auction  systems.  Where  even  a few  restrictions  of the simple  model  are relaxed,  the differential
equations  do not have a closed-form  solution, and the numerical  solutions prove computationally
excessive.  Unsumrrisingly,  few empirical  studies  have attempted  to validate  theoretical  auction  models,
and most  test some  implications  of the theory  using  reduced-form  models.  For instance,  they might try
to explain bids in terms of a reserve price, the number of potential  b:dders, characteristics  of the
auctioned  object  and characteristics  of bidders which affect  the common  distribution  of private  values
(e.g. Hansen, 1985;  Hendricks  and Porter, 1988).
Given  the complex  naure of the foreign  exchange  auctions  that we examine  in this paper, our
research approach  will be to follow the past tradition  in empirical  work and estimate  an unrestricted
reduced-form  model.  We then aim  to test the predictions  of a number  of simpler  auction  models,  to see
if they apply in more general  cases. In this section  we posit a simple  empirical  model  for the auction
clearing  rate. We account  for the auction  fundamentals  that have  effects  that can be signed  a priori (e.g.
foreign  exchange  supply,  the number  of bidders  and opportunity  cost). Further, the model  also allows
the testing of some propositions  motivated  by auction theory, such as the equivalence  of revenue-
generation  under different auction  formats, the effect of uncertainty  on bid levels, and the effect of
increasing  the pool of bidders (see section  2.2). Being a reduced-form,  our model  does not offer a
structural  interpretation  of the latter  effects.  In section  4, where  we estimate  and  test the model,  we draw
on the receiv-d wisdom from auction  theory, as well as the institutional  features of the auctions  in
question,  to provide  interpretation.
We begin  by setting  out the Harris  and Raviv  (1981)  theory  of Nash bidding  behaviour,  for the
case where  multiple  units are sold in a single auction,  and bidders  can purchase  at most one of these
units.  Following  Vuong  and Laffont  (1992),  we consider  the type of empirical  model  that emerges  from
the solved-out  equilibrium  bidding  strategies  for both competitive  and discrim-inatory  pricing. We then
consider  the  suitability  of this  empirical  model  for the more  general  case  of endogenous  quantity  decisions
by bidders (bidders  can purchase  more than one  unit of the good) and sequentially  repeated  auctions.
There are Q units of a homogeneous  good to be sold. The market consists  of N)  Q bidding
agents,  who each compete  for one unit of the good. Assume  that bidding agent i, i=1,...,N  places a-7-
monetary  value v 1 on a unit of the good, and that each  v, is drawn  with  replacement  from a distribution
with  density  function  h and  probability  function  H, where  the support  of h is [ 0,  i]  . If bidder  i submits
a sealed  bid b which  is accepted,  then  the monetary  gain  is v,  - bi , with  udlity u (v,  - b). It is assumed
that u (0) = 0, that  u (.) is increasing,  concave  and differentiable,  and that  the utility  of an unsuccessful
bid is zero. Bids b, =  b(v,)  are assumed  to be symumetric  Nash  equilibrium  strategies.'
These  bids are arranged  by the auctioneer  in decreasing  order  of price. In the Harris  and Raviv
model,  the Q highest  bidders  in a competitiv auction receive  one unit each at the price of the Q+ ith
highest  bid. Harris  and  Raviv  (1981)  show  thatunder competitive  bidding,  the Nash  equilibrium  bidding
strategy  for each  bidder (whether  risk neutral  or risk averse)  is to bid her true monetary  value:
bc(vi)=  V;  (1)
The competitive  price (clearing  rate) is then  bc (vN.q)  =  VN.. 
In the discriminatory  auction, the Q highest  bidders  pay the rate that they bid. Assume  that
bidder i believes  his competitors  will bid according  to the differentiable  bidding  function  bq  = b(vj),  for
j￿i,  where b; is increasing  on [0,  v]  . Let r denote  the inverse  of b; Ci.e. r (b(vj  )) = vj ). The
probability  that a bid b, will be accepted,  is the same  as the probability  that at least N-Q of the values
drawn  by bidding  agent i's competitors  are below ?r (bJ = v, . This probability,  F(-r (b..)),  is given by
the distribution  function  of the (N-Q)th  order  statistic  for a sample  of size N-I from the distribution  H:
FQ(Mb))  =  (N-  Q  -A)(Q  1)1  [H  H(v) M-Q-'  [i-H(v)]'Q-  h(v)  dv  (2)
The ith bidding  agent  ten  has to choose  b, to maximise  u (vi  - b) F(ir (b 1)), i.e. maximise  the bidder's
utility  should  the  bid be accepted,  multiplied  by the probability  that it will be accepted.  Harris  and  Raviv
(1981) show  that the Nash strategy  emerging  from the solution  of the first order condition  for this
maximisation  problem:
bD.(v,)  =  Fv)  x dF(x)  a
9The function  b(v) will be a Nash  equibnum bid functon if for every  i, b(vj ranmises  bidder  i's expected  utliy,  given
dia  every other  bidder  j uses die same saegy  b(vj.-8-
where Dn indicates  risk neutrality  under  discriminatory  pricing.  Harris  and Raviv  also prove  that where
all bidders  are risk averse and have  the same  strictly  concave  utility  function,  they will bid higher  than
risk neutral  bidders.
We now  tum to implications  of these theoretical  results  for the specification  of a reduced-form
empirical  model.  ThDe  bid which  is of special  interest  to us in the context  of the foreign  exchange  auctions
is the lowest accepted  winning  bid, which was defined  to be the clearing rate in all the Dutch and
competitive  auctions  in the four countries  we consider, and the rate on which the countries' exchange
rates were closely  bised (Aron and Elbadawi,  1994).  In the foreign  exchange  auctions  this is generally
the only bid observed by the researcher, while actual private values and their distribution  remain
unknown.  The preceding  discussion  showed  that the solution  for the bid of the N-Qth bidder under
competitive  or discriminatory  pricing,  depends  on the private  value  of the bidder,  the number  of bidders,
the size of supply  and the distribution  of private  values. The same theoretical  determinants  will apply
where  the clearing  rate is defined  on the lowest  accepted  rather than the highest  rejected  bid. Following
Laffont  and  Vuong  (1990),  we observe  that since  equilibrium  bids  are functions  of private  values,  which
are random  by assumption,  then  observed  bids for a single  auction  will also be random,  and be uniquely
determined  by the above  theoretical  determinants.  When  considering  several auctions  in an econometric
investigation,  account  also has to be taken of the fact  that the distribution  of private  values may  depend
on the heterogeneity  of the auctioned  object (e.g. different  characteristics  of the object in different
auctions  that are observed  by all bidders).
Based  on these  points,  and in the auction  empirical  tradition,  we propose  a simple  log-linearised,
reduced-form  empirical  model  for the clearing rate, for a series of mutually  independent  (no strategic
behaviour),  multi-unit  auctions  where  bidders  bid for at most one unit of a homogeneous  good:
ml  m,
oer,  Xl  |XSi,  iDUMI;  = f(F,)  >  ,  (4)
'i-l  i-I
where  oer, is the log of the auction  clearing  rate. The Xi =  [N, Rp,  Q,, ZI  is a vector  of variables  in
logs including  the number  of bidders (N); a reservation  price (Re), if one is used; the size of pre-
announced  supply (Q);  as well as the Z  variables, which are variables reflecting  the observable'°
characteristics  of the auctioned  object, and of the buyer side of the market, which may affect the
distribution  of private  values (Laffont  et al, 1991).  One important  Z variable  in the context  of foreign
exchange  auctions  is the secondary  market  (black  or bureaux)  exchange  rate, or ber. While  the resale of
auctioned  foreign  exchange  in the  secondary  market  was largely  prohibited  in these  auctions,  in the event
of the bid being  unsuccessful,  the bidder  could  resort  to the more expensive  secondary  market.  The ber
"'The Z variables may be  direy  observable,  or be  variables  over which bidders can  form  expectations.-9-
reflects  the opportunity  cost to bidders;  but is also a relevant  indicator  of macro-economic  policy  and
credibility  of reform (Aron  and Elbadawi, 1992).  The size of total demand  (Od)  is another  Z variable
which  reflects  the buyer side of the market.  The dummy  terms (DUM)  reflect  other qualitative  auction
fundamentals  or regime shifts, such as the auction  type (competitive  or Dutch)  or policy  intervention.
Note that the two auction  types  are not modelled  separately  as distinct  processes,  but the entire  period
of auctions  is considered  with inclusion  of a dummy  term to reflect the timing of the auction  regime
change; interactive  terms between  auction rate determinants  and the auction dummy could also be
included.  Finally,  et  is a stationary  disturbance  term.
If we allow  quantity  choice  to be endogenous  (bidders  specify  both  the desired number  of units
out of Q units and the price per unit in sealed  bids), the maximisation  of expected  utility  will yield  two
marginal  conditions,  for both the  price  and the quantity  demanded.  Quantity  demanded  can then  be solved
for and substituted  into the marginal  price condition.  While  the functional  form of the solution  will be
different  to the  single  unit  case, the  detrminants remain  identical.  Thus, the above  empirical  specification
for oer (equation  (4)), since it uses  a log linear form, will also be applicable  to the case  of a multi-unit
auction with endogenous  quantity  choice. The above reduced-form  model also assumes a series of
mutually  independent  auctions.  The equilibriumi  solutions  for a repeated multi-unit  auction are very
difficult  to characterise,  given  the possibilities  for learning  by agents  or strategic  behaviour  (e.g. Weber,
1983). We aim at least to  model such dynamic behaviour empirically,  by employing  unrestricted
dynamics  in the reduced-form  equation.  This is discussed  further  in section  3.1. In the context  of repeated
auctions,  uncertainty  may  be induced  in bidders  by a volatile  supply,  where  supply  is preannounced  but
only after the sealed  bids have been collected. Thus a measure  of the volatlity of supply could be
included  as a Z variable  (see section  2.2). The expected  signs  of the fundamental  variables  are:
oer =  F( N, Q,  Qd, ber, volatility(Q))
(+)  (-) (+)  (+)  (+)
Z.2  Policy hypotheses  motivated by aucion  theory.
The first policy  hypothesis  concerns  the choice  of the auction  pricing  mechanism.  One reason
given  by policy-makers  for their choice  of a Dutch  or discriminatory  auction  (where  each  bidder  pays his
own  bid) over the competitive  auction  (where  all bidders pay  the marginal  price) is the belief  that  Dutch
pricing  constitutes  a disincentive  to devaluation,  relative  to the competitive  auction-  That  is, equilibrium
price ("revenue"  to the auctioneer)  struck  at a Dutch auction  would  be lower  than, not equivalent  to, the
equilibrium  price in a competitive  auction.' 1 There is no theoretical  basis  for this claim, and to date no
"There may be some confiision of nomenclature  conermning  the concept  of  wrevenue  equivalence"  adopted  in this  paper.
The term stems from auction theory and rfers to the clearine vnice  stuck at a multi-unit  auction far different types of auction.
The policy relevance of this concept is dired  at the rate of deprdation of the exchange rate, and therefore  relates  to Ihe
principal  objective  of exchange  rate  unification.  This notion  of gross revenue  should  be distinguished  rom the macro-econouc- 10  -
robust evidence to support it for die case of foreign exchange auctions. Since the introduction  of a Dutch
auction may introduce other undesirable  features' 2, it is important to test the veracity of the policy claim.
We will use an important result of auction theory, the revenue-equivalence  theorem (Vickrey,
1961, 1962), which states that for a one-shot, single-unit auction, where bidders are risk-neutral and
symmetric, and  bidders'  (private) valuations are  uncorrelated,  revenue generation is  equivalent in
competitive  and discriminatory  auctiors. This prediction has proved sensitive to changes in the underlying
assumptions. In the single-unit case for an IPV model, replacing the assumption  of risk-neutrality wit
risk-aversion leads to  revenue-superiority of the discriminatory auction (Harris  and  Raviv,  1981).
Relaxing the IPV assumption by allowing risk-neutral bidders to  have affiliated values, Weber (1983)
shows that the competitive auction earns  more revenue.  However, if  risk-neutral bidders in an EPV
framework are not symmetric Ci.e.  there are observable differences amongst their valuations), the ranking
is indeterminate (iviaskin  and Riley, 1985). If entry decisions are not exogenous, then different auction
rules and formats can affect the set of bidder participants, and yield different expected revenues (e.g.
Hlarstad  et al, 1990); however, which types of auctions will revenue-dominate  in the presence of multiple
rule changes is not clear-cut. Finally, Robinson (1985) shows that revenue equivalence breaks down in
an WPV  auction under bidder collusion. In this case the Dutch auction is revenue-dominant.
The theory has focused on single-unit and one-shot WPV  auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988)
extends the theory for endogenous quantity decisions, and finds revenue-equivalence  for a one-shot, IPV
auction where risk-neutral bidders submit full demand schedules, and each uit  goes to the bidder who
values it most. Taking into account that lumpy bids (several units at the same price) are in practice more
usual than full demand schedules, Tenorio (1991) models endogenous quantity choice for  a one-shot
auction with risk neutral bidders. Revenue-superiority  is  mi  nt  in this model.
Each of these models separately relaxes one or two assumptions of the Vickrey model, so that
it is not clear which result would obtain under the relevant assumptions for foreign exchange auctions.
Further, it is important to note that there is no theoretical result conceming revenue-equivalence in the
repeated multi-unit case. Interpretation of our empirical results on revenueequivalence in Dutch and
competitive auctions will therefore draw on the simnpler  models, and consider the relative importance of
the various assumptions for the countries in question.
concept of net revenue accruing to the governmet as a net buyerlseler of foreign exchange  (which we wil  examine in fhre
work).
I2 Potl  disadvantages  to Dutch pricing are  first, if there is a large spread between bids, this may be constued  as
constitutig  a multiple exchange  rawe  systm  with the avedant  disadvantages  (Quirki, 1987); and secondly, a smaller pool of
bidders may ensue becausethe Dutch auction introduces  a barrier to entry for risk-aversebidders  who are poorly informed  about
marketdevelopments  (Goldstein,  1962).  Theorypredicts  that Dutch pricing lessens collusion  (Robinson,  1985); but some  authors
are of dte view that drough  a narrower range of bidders, Dutch pricing may also encourage collusion  (Quirck et al, 1987).- 11 -
Tae second policy hypothesis concerns the volatility of the number of multiple units offered for
sale in sequential auctions. Policy-makers have implicated the volatility of supply in auction failure
through increasing exchange rate instability. Supply to the SSA foreign exchange auctions was largely
due to foreign aid and conmmodity  export receipts. Both these components are vulnerable  to shocks: aid
may be suddenly withdrawn; while export concentration in primary commodities is very high in SSA,
and is subject to terms of trade swings, drougLhts  and other shocks.?3  Arguably, short-term volatility
should be less important  for investors than uncertainty about sustained supply in the medium-term. The
perception that supply is unsustainable would damage the credibility of the exchange reform, and induce
speculative activity, manifested in both price and allocation. The price is likely to overshoot a realistic
rate, and the premium rise to reflect incredibility; the use of funds would be skewed towards durable
goods or inventories (Calvo, 1987).'4  There may thus be important implications  concerning the role of
donor aid to ensure a sustainable supply in the interim."
If bidders in repeated multi-unit auctions are risk averse, and are confronted with uncetainty  in
the form of a supply of units that may be highly volatile from week to week (where supply is pre-
announced, but only after submission of all the sealed bids), theory suggests that this risk aversion will
operate to the seller's advantage (Harris and Raviv, 1981). Maginally  increasing the bid increases the
probability of that bid being successful, even if profits are lowered for the bidder. Thus, controlling  for
auction type, we will test if increased supply volatility (proxying for increased uncertainty)  induces  a risk-
premium on the bids, resulting in upward pressure on the equilibrium exchange rate
The third and final policy hypothesis relates to competition in the foreign exchange auctions. On
two of the four countries we examine the auctions were broadened over time, relaxing entry restrictions
to allow more types bidders to participate, and making more items eligible for import with winning bids.
In the other countries, the opposite occurred, inducing perceptions of the incredibility of the exchange
rate reform, and speculative bidding. The reimposition of tighter restrictions in these countries was
apparently in order to stem the more rapid increase in the auction rate (exchange rate depreciation).
We hope to test an auction-theoretic  result to show that increasing the number of bidders increases
the revenue on average of the seller (Harris and Raviv, 1981). Obviously the pattern of the increase will
13 Furthermore, supply  could be well  .elow  export eanings siuce actionable funds were frequenly decided  after satisfyg
the requirements  of die government  and public enterprss  outside the auction. For insance, auctionable  fends as a proportion
of total inflows  for Zambia  and Uganda in the 1980s  were estimatd  to be as low as 25 per ceat (Quirck ct al, 1987).
14  There  is evidence  linking such speculative  consequencerwith  Iow  credility  in  Ihe  Zambanauction (Aron  and Ebadawi,
1992; Bates and Collier, 1992).
'5  It is possible  that these auctions experienced official intervention  through supply manipulaion to prevent exchange rate
depreciation,  or atain odter  objectives.  This does not  prove a problem for our estimations  in section  4, becauseempirical models
with constant parameterizations  despite structnal  change (Table 2) exhibit super exogeaeity, which implies weak exogeneity,
diereby sustaining  valid staistical infrrence (see Gilbert, 1936). However, our future research will examine more closely the
potmtial presence of supply policy and other implicit rules.- 12 -
depend on the  type of  auction, the  characteristics of the  auctioned object,  and  firm and  industry
characteristics (Branmman  et al, 1987). Some auction models have clear predictions for the relationship
between winning bids and the number of bidders. It may be less predictable for other types of auctions,
particularly under risk-aversion, correlated values and uncertainty concerning the value of the auctioned
object
3.  DATA AND EMPICAL  MEHODOLOGY.
There has been very little empirical work on foreign exchange auctions in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Apart from policy-based surveys (e.g.  Krumm,  1985; Quirck et al,  1987; Roberts,  1989), only the
Zambian auctions appear to have been studied in any detail (e.g. Tenorio, 1993; Bates and Collier, 1993;
Aron and Elbadawi, 1992). To the best of our knowledge,  the only micro-economic  research on the SSA
auctions motivated by auction theory is due to Tenorio (1993), who tested for the revenue-equivalence
of the two types of auctiont  which appeared consecutively  in the eighteen  month Zambian experiment. In
general, there have been no controlled experiments on foreign exchange auctions using generated data,
nor have the dynamic  feaures  of repeated auctions been studied.
Yet,  there is enormous scope for  research on  foreign exchange auctions in  SSA, both  in
comparative time-series and cross-sectional panel data studies. The SSA case-studies present a  wide
spectrum of auction designs and outcomes for cross-country comparisons. In a number of countries,
different auction types follow consecutively, allowing  within-country comparisons  of auction design. For
a few countries the data set includes detailed individual bidder data for each auction; this allows an
analysis of allocation, of dynamic features such as learning and strategic behavior across auctions, and
the determination  of the distribution of actual bidder values. Finally, weekly parallel data is available for
most of the countries, so that the progress of unification can be followed throughout the transitional
auction phase.
A description of our data set is contained in Aron and Elbadawi (1994). The paper discusses
design characteristics  for the Zambian, Ugandan, Ghanaian  and Nigerian auctions, which are summarized
in its Table 1. In Table 2 of that paper, basic statistics are given for the auction data, according to auction
regimes, and ihese statistics, as well as a number of measures of nor-normality of the data (skewness  and
kurtosis), are discussed in detail.
3.1t  Cointegation  Modelling in Repeated,  Sequential Auctions
The analysis of the individual  time series properties of the auction markets' pivotal variables, such
as the  level and variance of  the selling price (exchange rate),  the black market premium, and the
demand/supply of foreign exchange, shows that the time  series structures of these high frequency- 13  -
variables are non-stationary (i.e. with infinite variances at the limit) 1' and are dominated by structural
breaks and regime shifts (see Aron and Elbadawi, 1994).  This finding has important implications in its
own right; for example, shocks to the auction variables tend to have high persistence. However, non-
stationarity  has profound effects on the econometric modelling  and estimation of the behavioral theoretical
specification suggested by auction theory (see section 2.1 above).  When all or some of the variables
involved in an econometrically  estimable relationship, such as the one suggested for the auction rate, are
non-stationary, it is important to guard  against spurious regressions (Granger and Newbold,  1974).
However, the equilibrium relationship  between a number of non-stationary  variables can be expressed in
a stationary model if a linear combination of these variables can be found to be stationary (termed a
cointegrating vector)."'  The Granger-Engle Representation theorem (Engle and Granger,  1987) staes
that if series are cointegrated they can be consistently represented by an error correction mechanism
(ECM), which captures the short-run dynamics  of adjustment  towards a long-run equilibrium relationship.
The attractiveness of this approach for our work is that we can model the weekly dynamics in repeated
auctions with non-stationary  auction variables, and follow the adjustnent to  unified markets in the long-
run.
Therefore,  to  be  able to  ascribe any behavioural interpretations to  the estimated economic
relationship, it is important to test for cointegration in the regression specification, in addition to the
preliminary stationarity tests on  individual variables.  However,  a challenge is presented here in a
common phenomenon in SSA countries of frequent, and often drastic, structural breaks in the series.
Recent work has shown that tests that do not account for structural breaks may erroneously find non-
stationarity (e.g. Perron,  1989; Hendry and Ericsson,  1993). Perron (1989) assumes the timing of the
regime shifts to be known, while the others cited above offer tests of a unit root that also determine the
t  Formadly, let Yt  TD,  +  Z, be an economic series composed  of  a deterministic  trend TD, and a stochastic  component
For simplicity  assme  that Z, can be described  by an autoregressive-nmong avenge  process:
A(L)ZA  =  B(L) e, where A(L) and B(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L and ;  is a sequence  of i.id.  imnovations. The
noise function  Z  is assumed to have mean zero, the moving  average polynomial  is also assumed to have roots strictly outside
the unit circle.  Then  7Z  has a unit root if A(L) has one unit rot  and all other roots stricdly  outside the unit circle.  In this case
(1-L)Z, =  AZ: is a stationary process and (1-L)y, =  Ayt  is stadionary  around a fixed mean.  If on the otter  hand A(L) has all
its roots outside the unit circle, then Z 1 is a stationary process and y, is stationry around  a trend.
17  The idea of cointegration  basically  states  t  even tough  individual  series may have a urdt root, there may exist various
linear combinations  of variables which are  stadonary.  Stated more formally in die context of the definition of the above
footnote,  let the n-vector y,  be copsed  of (y,,  ...  y,j,  where yi is defined  as in  e  footnoe  above.  Then y, is said to be
cointegrated  if there exists at least one n-element vector 6  such that ,B'y, is trend satdonary.  This is a milder definion  of
cointegration  (Campbell  and Perron. 1991),  which is more suited to analysis of economic  data since it permits the inclusion  of
deterninistic  components  (such  as  trends  and  structural break  dummies)  in the  cointegrtion  npodel along  with  other non-
stationary  stochastic variables.- 14-
timing  of the structural  breaks.  In our case,  since  we have  precise  information  about  the structural  breaks,
we opted  for using  Perron methodology,  given its simplicity.t"
Figure 1 shows  fitted  trends  with one-shot  intercept  and/or slope  changes  for at least  two  clearly
identified  regimes  in the auction  exchange  rate series for the cases of Zambia,  Uganda,  and Nigeria.
Three distinct  regimes  can be identified  for Ghana.  The results  of the tests, and  the models  of structural
breaks corresponding  to the fitted trends, are shown in Table 1, together with the critical values
employed.  The table reveals  the presence  of considerable  non-stationarity  and regime-  shifts for most of
the auction  data from the four countries  even when structural  breaks  were taken into account.  This is
unsurprising  in view  of the stylised  facts  which  emphasise  rule changes,  the non-normality  of auction  data
and  the importance  of anticipations  of policy  changes.
Besides generating  consistent estimates of  the economic  parameters implied by  a  model
specification  such as in section  2.1, the other main  objective  of our econometric  methodology  is to test
some  policy  propositions  suggested  by auction  theory (see  section  2.2). This  requires  that  the equilibrium
model  should  be esimated asmptotically  efficiently.  Cointegration  readily  guarantees  consistent  (in  fact
super-consistent)  estimation  for the eqailibrium  parameters  using  a simple  OLS  regression  (see  Engle  and
Granger, 1987)."  Unfortunately,  the simple cointegration  regression  usually  produces  substantially
inefficient  asymptotic  estimators  (Phillips and Loretan, 1991).  Given our interest in generating
asymptotically  efficient  pointwise  estmators with  smaller  margins  of errors around  the true equilibrium
parameters,  the direct  cointegration  estimation  will not  be adequate  for the problem  at hand. Phillips  and
Loretan  propose  a modified  ECM that  can be used to obtain  asymptotically  efficient  estimation  of long-
run equaiibria  in models  with stochastic  trends. Subscribing  to the above  empirical  paradigm,  we will
model  the dynamic  behavior  of the auction variables  with a single-equation  error correction  model
(ECM), with leads and lags in the differences  of the regressors,  and which includes  structural  break
dummy  variables.  This type of model  will be estimated  by non-linear  OLS, and is recommended  by
Phillips  and Loretan  (1991)  for hypothesis  testing.  The form of the modified  one-step  ECM regression
equation  is as follows:
IPedron  (1989)  computed critical values  for a Dickey-Fuler and Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests that include  two types of
stwuctual breaks:  one causing  a shift in the intercept, and dt  other a change in the slope. A key assumption  of the Perron est
is dtat  these  shocks are exogenous  and are not a ralization of the underlying  data  generating  mecham.  Furtbermore, his test
requires hat the fiming  of the shocks be known. In our  ae  both  of these two conditions  apply (Aron  and Elbadawi, 1994,  Table
1).
19 The justification for cointgrtion  give. the short span of high frequency (weekly)  data may be somewhat  problematic:
ideally the requirment  for non-stationarity  tests to be valid is both long time saies  data and high frequecy  darN. However,
the span of our data is comparable  with that commonly  analysed  in stock market and foreign exchange  settings (e.g. Froot and
Obstfeld, 1991 and references cited therein).
20 Phillips  and Lretan  (1991) evaluatevarious empirical  methods  for esimating co-integting  relationships,  and show that
single equation ECM models are  efficient asymptotic estimators of long-run equilibrium  relationships  when formulated non-
inearly  dtough the explicit inclusion of lagged equilibria, and incorpoatig  leads and lags of differenced  regressors.- 15  -
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where, iq is a stationary disturbance term,  A is the difference operator, and f(F) is the log-linearized
specification  of equation (4) above, giving the determinants of the auction clearing rate.
4.  ESTIMATION AND HYPOTESIS  TESTING.
This section estimates model (5) above for the micro-deteminants of the auction rate. After a
discussion  of model diagnostics, and ascertaling  that the model is broadly corroborated by data from the
four countries, three hypotheses motivated by auction theory which -have policy implications, will be
tested.  The testing will involve the revenue equivalence and competitiveness hypotheses, and  also
whether increased uncertainty (proxied by supply volatility) induces a risk premium on bids.
4.1  Evaluating the static and  dynamic features  of the estimations.
Given the characteristics of auction data (non-stationarity and regime shifts) and the repeated,
sequential nature of  foreign exchange auctions in  SSA,  we  argued in  section 3  on  the empirical
methodology for an ECM estimating framework.  The ECM framework accounts for the dynamics in
weekly repeated auctions,  while permitting  estimation of  the  adjustment path  towards  a  unified
equilibrium rate in the long-run.  Furthermore, the expanded non-linear version of the ECM suggested
by Phillips and Loretan (op. cit), which we will employ here, provides asymptotically  efficient estimators
for the parameters of equation (5), suitable for hypothesis testing.  The empirical model is stated below.
21'  ' 
19ogoe),  =  ,Y[  a  + +  aO  log0(QSl +  a2 1og9Q4d),  +  a3 1og(bidty  +a 4 MAV  (Alog(qsA)_
+  a5log(ber),_, +  i0  DUMDutch  +  61 Di  +  &2  D2  +  6, D3 - log oer 1,]
1 For  ethositonal  ournose  only,  the ECM  is presented  in a restricted  form  (two  rror  terms,  one lead and two lags),  but
in the estimation more general lag/lead  struchtres  were considered.  For a  fill  exposition  of the form and properties  of the non-
linear  single equation  ECM enployed  here,  see  Phillips and Loritan  (op. cit.).-16  -
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The variables are as defined in equation (5) above, where oer is the auction rate; Q, and q
are,  respectively, actual foreign exchange supplied and total foreign exchange demanded&%  bidt is
number of total bids?";  ber is the bureaux or the parallel market exchange rate (the opportunity cost of
holding foreign exhange); MAV(6log qs) is the moving average of the monthly variance (t3, t2, t4, t)
of the rate of  change in  foreign exchange supply, reflecting supply variability?'  DUMDutch is a
dummy for the Dutch auction, and DI,  D2 and D3 stand for regime shift dummies (defined in section
4.1).  The first two bracketed terms give the first and second lagged equilibrium error (the long-run
coefficients are the same).  The remaining differenced lagged and lead terms represent the transitory
dynamic effects on the auction rate.  The equilibrium error represent the dynamic effects on the current
auction rate of previous periods'  departures from  equilibrium.  For  example for  a  lagged positive
equilibrium error  (i.e a more depreciated equilibrium rate than the acmal in the previous period), the
fundamentals  will call for an auction rate increase (depreciation)  in the current period.
We employed general-to-specific  modelling (e.g.  see Gilbert, 1986) when estimating the non-
linear empirical equation, and the results for the four countries are shown in Table 2. The results broadly
corroborate the predictions of the theory, in that long-run (static) determinants of the auction rate have
theoretically consistent and statistically significant effects.  The data lend strong support to the ECM,
2 It is possible  dtht the quantiy demanded  is collinear with the number of bids, and where 2here  is leaning thrugh  the use
of a reserve price or pre-anonced  supply, also the quantity  supplied. Under non-stationarity  and co-integration,  however,  these
foms  of endogeneity  should not constitute a problem for consistent OLS estimation of the paraneters  of inerest,  given the
super-consistency  of the OLS estimator (section  3.1).
=  A positive  relationship  is indicated  by auction theory between the number  of bidders and die auction rate (Branaman a
a1, 1987). Given that these are integrated price and quantity bids, total demand mnay  be a better demand indicator than the.
number  of bids (renorio.  1993).
2 Variance is not defined for non-statonary variables. Given the departure from normality (skewness  and excess kurwsis)
found to characteriz  auction data (Aron and Elbadawi (1994), skewness  and excess kurtosis measures were included in our
general equations,  as finther proxies for foreign exchange  supply uncertinty  (these were not found to be significant).- 17 -
where the equilibrium error  term  in all equations is highly significant, positive and less than one.
Further, the estimates also show substantial influence on the short-run evolution of the auction rate of
transitory changes in auction fundamentals.  Also other diagnostic indicators show that the estimated
models are statistically correct (e.g.  in the sense of Hendry - see Gilbert (1986)),5 hence they can be
used to test economic  propositions.  Before considering some theoretical hypotheses we turn to the brief
description of the estimates on the effect due to the basic determinants (Qs, Qd, ber).
Table 2 contains two equations for  each country.  In addition to the variables estimated in
equation 1, the second equation also considers foreign exchange supply variability.  The coefficient of
the error-correction  term in the Nigeria equation is the highest at about 0.6 and is highly significant. The
error-correction effects for the other three countries are also statistically  significant, but their numerical
values are much smaller:  0.08 for Zambia, 0.07 for Uganda and 0.02 for Ghana. This implies that
adjustment  towards equilibrium was relatively fast in Nigeria and rather slow for the others, especially
Ghana.  To eliminate 90% of an exogenous shock to the auction rate through automatic adjustment
alone, 2'  it takes only 4 weeks in Nigeria, compared to  26 for  Zambia, 30 for Uganda and  120 for
Ghana. This result agrees very closelyw ith a Cochrane (1988) type analysis  of persistence on the auction
rate series (see Aron and Elbadawi, 1994). This analysis showed that the share of the random walk
component in the total  variance of the rate of change in the auction rate,  while large  for all four
countries, is noticeably  smaller for Nigeria, and to some extent, Zambia. The rate of convergence also
started rather more rapidly in these two countries. This finding is consistent with the use of a stochastic
reserve pricer  in Ghana and Uganda, as opposed to the frequent and direct policy interventions that
characterized the Zambian, and especially the Nigerian auctions (Figure 1).
We now consider the parameter estimates of the long-run economic equilibrium or cointegrated
relationship. Foreign exchange supply and demand are two conventional  determinants  of the auction rate,
that are robustly estimnated  to  have theoretically consistent signs:  a  sustainable increase in  supply
(demand) should reduce (increase) the equilibrium auction rate.  The estimated coefficients are highly
25  Stabiity tests (Chow tests) found parameter stability for Zambia, Nigeria and Uganda (rabic 2). The Ghana equation
marginaily failed the F test (at the I per cent level), suggesting that  the relatonship modelled altered over the sample period.
This resultwas unsurprsing given the length  of the data  seiies (270 auctions over six years), and reinforces  the authors' opinion
that  the retail and wholesale  auctions should  be umdefled  separately  in ftiure research. The  stability  results are further reinforced
by the comparative namre  of the analysis, in that similar parameter estinates  were obtained for the four countries. Note hat
parameter stability implies super exogcncity, itself implying weak exogencity, necessary for valid statistical  infermnce More
formally,  out-of-smple forecast  properties  should  be exanined well. However,  the prevalence  of structural  regime shifts  in these
high frequency  data makes  forecasting very problematic.
M6  The number of weeks to clear 100% of an exogenous shock through automatic adjustnent alone can be computed from
die formula:  (1 - a)  = (1 - -y)T,  where -y  is the coefficient  of the equilibrium  error term and T is the number of weeks.  This
formula  can be obtained by manipulating  the error-correction  specification in (3).
2  The reserve prices closely fallow the evolution of the bureaux  or parallel rates in Ghana and Uganda which are shown
to be 1(1)  series (Table 1).- 18 -
significant for the case Ghana and Uganda. but only moderately so in the other two cases (at about 10
percent significance level). 23 Another conventional effect is the opportunity cost of foreign exchange,
proxied here by the bureaux (or parallel market) rate.  Aside from its role as an opportunity cost, in the
context of fbreign exchange auctions in SSA, the black /bureaux rate is a relevant indication of macro-
economic policy and credibility, and is closely linked to macro indicators such as money supply growth
and inflation (Aron & Elbadawi, 1993). In all of the four countries this variable has a highly significant
and positive estimated coefficient.  The estimated elasticity is quite high in Ghana (0.7) and Zambia
(0.76), compared to the rather moderate effects estimated for Nigeria (0.21) and Uganda (0.28).  One
possible explanation for this dichotomy is the degree of competitiveness in these two sets of auctions.
In Ghana (for 174/270 auctions) and Zambia, the bidders are a large number of importers; while in the
other two countries there are a limited number of banks bidding (even though the Ugandan auction is
indirectly a retail auction). Arguably in the first case the bureaux/parallel rate is an important signal, and
collusion plays no major role; hence the appreciable coefficient estimated for the black/bureaux effect. 2'
Three further potential determinants  of the long-run aucLion  rate are: auction type (Dutch pricing
vs. competitive), the number of bids and foreign exchange supply variability. The effects due to these
three  variables provide the pretext for  testing three  hypotheses motivated by  auction theory,  with
important policy implications. The Dutch auction (coefficient of DUMDutch) is found to  have had
significant effects in both of Nigeria and Zambia, albeit with different signs.  As predicted by theory the
number of bids has a positive elasticity (Nigerian equation)-confirming that increased competition leads
to  an  auction rate  depreciation.  Finally supply variability  was  not  found to  be  relevant to  the
determination of the auction rate.  The interpretation of these results and discussions of the hypotheses
are provided in the following sub-section.
A number of dummies relating to rules affecting bidder participation were found to be significant.
For Nigeria two auction policy interventions are estimated to have effected a structural shift in the long-
run auction rate- In auctions 22 and 23, after an announcement concerning tightened entry restrictions,
major disqualifications of bids occurred (D2); and in auctions 60-65 various banks were barred from
participating in the auctions for the same reason; also tighter ceilings on allowable foreign exchange
purchases were introduced (D3). As expected the direct effects of these interventions  should be to reduce
competition, but perhaps more importantly the credibility of the auction regime itself may have been
adversely affected as a result.  Further, it is likely that adjustment  had taken place already in the auction
rate prior to the time the pre-announced measure was effected.  Hence it is not surprising to find highly
significant and positive effects for both of D2 and D3.  In Zambia. auction 41 saw the institution of
31  Given the extent of policy intervention  and disqualifications  in Nigeria and Ziambia,  it is likely that the auctions exhibit
rather significant departures  from the competitive  model.
39  Thus the hypothesis  of homogeneity  can be accepted for Ghana and Zambia (i.e. a change in the units of measurement
of the exchange rate will not affect the long-run solution)._  19  _
stringent  documentation  requirements,  and heavy disqualifications  occurred  in that week, captured  by
dummy  D2: the reduced  demand  saw a sharp  fall in the auction  rate. Another  policy  intervention  causing
a  structural shift in the long-run rate was estimated for Uganda.  Starting from auction 21, the
disbursement  of foreign  exchange  was changed  to cash basis rather than  a guarantee  basis. This change
improved  the efficiency  of the auction  by reducing  transaction  costs and hence  encouraged  participation
(by drawing  agents  who  would  otherwise  may  prefer  to purchase  foreign  exchange  at the more  expensive
but efficient  bureaux  de change).3 0
Finally, we briefly  review  the evidence  on the short-mn influences  on the auction  rate.3" In all
of the four regressions,  the bureaux (parallel)  rate has a significant  and positive  impact  elasticity,  in
agreement  with their estimated  long-run  effects.?  In Nigeria, Zambia  and Ghana, foreign  exchange
supply  (and  demand)  have  (net)  negative  (positive)  short-run  impact  elasticities,  again  consistent  withi  their
long-run  effects. In Uganda  the short-run  effects of these  two variables  are estimated  significantly,  but
with opposite signs to their corresponding  long-mn elasticities.  Also, surprisingly,  in the Nigerian
regression,  an expected  increase  in the number  of bidders  (Alog(bidtQj 1) was estimated  to have  a negative
effect  on the current  auction  rate.
However,  a possible  explanation  for the expected  foreign  exchange  supply  increase  in Uganda,
Ghana  and Nigeria, and  the rise in the expeced number  of biddes in Nigeria, and the expected  foreign
exchange  demand  in Ghana,  may be due to a reverse  causality  between  these variables  and  the rate of
depreciation  in the auction  rate Ceft-hand  side  variable).  Tnus, current  depreciation  by increasing  the cost
of bids may have reduced  the expected  number of bids in Nigeria; with regard to foreign exchange
supply,  the authorities  may  be responding  to current  auction  rate  depreciation  by increasing  future  foreign
exchange  supply  to accommodate  the liberalisation  of entry  restrictions;  finally,  decreased  future  demand
by bidders  may  follow  for the same  reason  as for the case of the number  of bids.
4.2  Testing policy  hypotheses.
Three policy  hypotheses  motivated  by auction  theory were introduced  in section  2-2 The first
policy  hypothesis  is the revenue  equivalence  hypothesis,  which  could  be tested  for Nigeria  and Zambia,
since  competitive  and Dutch  auction  regimes  follow  consecutively  in each case  (Figure 1).  The equations
are shown in Table 2, where the short-run dynamics  of the repeated auctions are modelled, and
perceptions  of changes  in reform  credibility  are captured  by including  the black  market  rate  as regressor.
3 Effors to capqe  the effects of progressive phases of import liberalsauon and decreased  mry  requirements in Ghana
using  dummies  did not prove successfil, due to singularity of the datt
"It  is important to note that the  Phillips and Loritan (1991) methodology is concerned with efficient estimation and
hypodLesis  testing in lone-run econoniic  equilibria  short-run dynamics may not be readily intepretable.
"Expected  depreciation in the bureax (parallel) raze (logberl.1)  was estimated to have a negative inpact  effect of the
current auction rate.  The overall net short-un  effect of dte bureaux rate is still positive, however.-20  -
We include in f (F) in the ECM model (5) of Section 4. 1, a dummy variable which captures the change
in auction regime CDUMdutch  is equal to 0 for the competitive auctions and to I for the discriminatory
auctions). Referring to the empirical specification, the null hypothesis for revenue equivalence is then
Hn 6:  =  0  in the long-run equilibrium term of the empirical specification (equation (6)).f  The test
compares the average level of the clearing price of a series of competitive auctions with the average
clearing price of a set of discriminatory auctions. If revenue equivalence holds, the dummy variable
indicating  the change of regime is not expected to be significant. If the dummy is significant and positive
this indicates  that the Dutch auction is revenue-superior. If the dummy is significant and negative this
indicates that the competitive auction is revenue-superior. We consider that this method of testing for
revenue equivalence improves on an earlier analysis  of this question for the foreign exchange auction in
Za:mbia.'
As discussed in section 4.1,  the  DUMdutch dummies are significant for  both Zambiae  and
Nigeria, indicating that revenue-equivalence  does not obtain in these repeated, multi-unit auctions. For
Nigeria, the Dutch auction is revenue-superior, while in Zambia, the competitive auction dominates.
There are no theoretical results for revenue equivalence in repeated, multi-unit auctions. The important
result here is that a dynamic empirical framework for repeated multi-unit auctions in two different
countries found  departures  from  revenue  equivalence depending on  the  relevance  of  underlying
assumptions  on bidder valuations, risk-aversion and competitiveness. The theory (section 2.2) suggests
that affiliation of bidders' values may explain the results in Zambia: bids were published for most of the
auction, and this public information  would have  figured in bidders' exchange rate forecasts. For Nigeria's
wholesale auction, controlling for the number of bids and rules affecting bidder participation, it appears
that collusive behaviour by the small number of banks, largely state-owned, could explain the result of
Dutch-dominance.  High risk-aversion is not a convincing explanation  for the Nigerian result, since  banks
were guaranteed  a minimum allocation. On the strength of these two results, there appears to be no clear-
33  It is important to note that we are not testing for equivalence of the average change in die exchange rate across
regimes: the left-hand variable in the long-run equation is the level of the equilibrium  auction rate.
Te  first-ever  test of the (weak) revenue  equivalencehypodtis  employing  acual  auction dat  from a repeated mulli-mt
auction is found in Tenorio (1993). He regresses the level of the auction-determined  rate in Zambia  on autoregssive  terms in
the dependent  variable, a trend term to capture any non-statonarity, controls for the supply and demand  variables, and includes
an auction dumMny  term, which equals O during the conmettive auction and I for the Dutch auction. However, the dynanics
in this analysis are very restrictive, including lags of the dependent variable, but without good reason excluding a  nori all
lagged  fundamentals.  The non-stationarity  of the regressors  was not tested for, and a general time tend was employed  to capture
non-stationarities.  This is unnecessarily restrictive since the  bubbles and expectational responses implied by normality and
stationarity tests are  extremely unlikely to follow an infiniite  linear trend. The persistence in  the rate is shcOwn  by huge
coefficients  for the lagged rate. with all other variables insignificant save the trend and dummies.
5  Note that the same result (with a different magnitude of the coefficient)  was achieved by Tenoio  (1993) for Zambia.
though in the context  of poorly  deternmned equations  (see earlier  footnote).-21 -
cut policy  advantage  in use of a Dutch  auction  to stem the pace of devaluation  across repeated  foreign
exchange  auctions.
Note that this  test for revenue  equivalence  can be expressed  in a stronger  form, by including  an
interactive  dummy between  the number  of bidders and the dummy variable for the auction method
(Hansen, 1986). In this case, the null hypothesis  to  accept revenue equivalence  implies that the
coefficients  on the interactive  term and the separate  auction  format  dummy  term must be jointly zero.
This test takes into account  the fact that bidder participation  may be higher under different  auction
formats  (for instance,  entry may be limited  under a Dutch auction  where bidding  strategies  are more
complex  - see Goldstein  (1962)  in the U.S.A. Treasury Bill debates).  Unfortunately  this test was not
possible  in the Zambian  case  due to the definition  of bids.6 For the case  of Nigeria, an F test for the
joint significance  of the two dummy  terms  was F (2,47) =  2.983,  thus still rejecting revenue  equivalence
(at a 10  per cent level)  in favour  of Dutch  revenue  dominance. 37
The second policy hypothesis is concerned with the effect of increased volatility of the number
of multiple units offered for sale in sequential auctions on the level of the auction rate. The hypothesis
that we test, controlling  for auction  type, is that periods of increased  supply  volatility  induce a risk-
premium  on the bids  for risk averse bidders,  resulting  in upward pressure  on the equilibrium  exchange
rate. This  hypothesis  could  be tested  for all four countries.  The Zambian,  Ghanaian  and  Ugandan  auctions
all showed  a considerable  degree  of supply  volatility  (with  supply not known  to bidders until after the
bids were submitted)  for all or part of the auction regime (Aron and Elbadawi, 1994).  In Nigeria,
volatility  was less  pronounced  since actual  supply  coincided  with a fairly  constant  offered  supply  (Aron
and Elbadawi,  1994:  Table 1). The results  are shown  in Table  2. In a second  equation  for each country,
we include  in f(F) in the ECM model  (5) of Section  4.1, an additional  explanatory  variable,  the moving
average  of the monthly  variance  of the differenced  supply  (which  is stationary).  Referring  to the empirical
specification,  the null  hypohesis is  -then H.: a  0 in the long-mn  equilibrium  term of the empirical
specification  (equation  (6)).
For all four countries  supply  volatility  did not prove  significant.  Assuming  risk averse  bidders,
this result  might  be explained  for the cases  of Ghana  and Uganda,  by the use of an (unannounced)  reserve
pricing  rule which  appeared  to have been  learned  by bidders 3 . In this case, the uncertainty  induced  by
361  In Zambia, the number  of bidders does not equal the published number  of bids. This is because for reasons of trade and
exchange  control. the publishod  bids:were dissagregatedby usae  of tbreign exchange:  thus each bidder's single  bid was reported
as components constained to be at die same price. It is not  possible to aggregate the bids and detemnine  the number of bidders
for the whole of the auction because they  were only published individually for auctions 37-68. 'This unfortunatly invalidates
the attempt in Tenorio (1993)  to establish "strong revenue equivalence", using an interaction  dummy composed  of the number
of "bidden" and the regine change.
37 Tle  Dutch dummy becomes more positive, with somewhat  reduced significance; the inteactive term is insignificant
3' In principle, tde presence of learning can be tested for (e.g. Doninguez.  1991). and this is a fruitful a  for further
research.22 -
supply  volatility  would  not induce  a risk premium  on the bids. Alternatively,  bidders  may  have  been  risk
neutral.  This latter  explanation  probably  applies  for Zambia,  and supports  the conclusion  reached  on the
basis of the revenue  equivalence  result. For Nigeria,  supply was pre-announced  for all or part of the
auctions, in which case it was fairly stable relative to the variability  of the auction  rate. Preliminary
regressions  (not reported  here)  suggest  that supply  volatility  is an important  determinant  of exchange  rate
voJatility,  This would  be  a fruitful area for further research,  with the implication  that foreign aid may
have  an important  ameliorating  effect  on supply  volatility  induced  by temporary  terms  of trade shocks.
The final testable  hypothesis  with policy  implications  concerns  competitiveness  in auctions.  We
consider  the following  hypothesis:  the level of the exchange  rate rises with expansion  of the auction
through  expanding  the number  of eligible  bidders/items.  We  test this hypothesis  by including  the number
of bids in f (F) in the  I9CM  model  (5)  of Section  4.1. The null hypothesis  is H:  as =  0 in the empirical
specification  of the long-run  equilibrium  term (equation  (6))." Unfortunately  we were only able to test
this hypothesis  for Nigeria. The reason is that in Ghana, total bid data is only available  for the retail
auction;  in Uganda,  bid data refers  to aggregated  bids  submitted  by banks;  in Zambia,  total bids include
multiple  bids  at the same  price  by individual  importers,  differentiated  by the use of foreign  exchange.  The
results  for Nigeria  show  a significant  and positive  effect  for the number  of bids, showing  that  in the long-
run  there is evidence  for the theoretically-predicted  competitiveness  effect  in a multi-unit  repeated  auction.
It is important  to note  that this result  obtains  with the model  controlling  for policy  interventions  and the
consequent  structural  shifts which  characterised  the Nigerian  auction.
5.  CONCLUSIONS.
This  paper has estimated  models  for the micro-determinants  of the auction rate using  weekly
foreign  exchange  auction  data from four Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  Zambia,  Uganda,  Ghana  and
Nigeria.  A simple  underlying  model  synthesized  from auction  theoretical  literature  specifies  the auction
rate as a linear logarithmic  function  of fundamental  variables  and structural  shift dummies.  It was not
possible  to produce  a structural  model,  as currently  there is no available  theoretical  model  in the literature
for repeated  sequential  multi-unit  auctions  of this type.  However,  the repeated,  sequential  nature  of these
auctions  and the  non-stationarity  of most  of the  individual  auction  variables  was captured  empirically  by
a  cointegrated  (error correction) framework. Even though this model does not allow a  structural
interpretation  of the  auction  rate determinants,  it permits  estimation  of the long-run  path of the auction
"9 Cointegration  has one distinct advantage  when measuring  the effect of competition  on bid levels. Hansen (1985)  points
out that  with  a positive reserve  price, the theoretically  relevant variable for the number  of bidders is not the actual number of
bidders, but the umneasurable  Potential number of bidders. Giley and Karcls (1981) have c-rrected for dtis tuncated error
problem by the Heckman procedure, including a dichotomous bidding decision: bid/do noi bid. However, in the context of
cointegration.  the variables  involved are 1(1), and the estimators  wil be consistent  whether or not the bidding  decision dummy
variable is included.-23  -
rate in addition  to accounting  for short-run  dynamic  behaviour.  In addition  to consistently  estimating  long-
run and parameters of auction fundamentals,  a modified version of the error correction model (a la
Phillips  and Loritan, 1991)  allows asymptotically  efficient testing of three policy hypotheses motivated
by auction  theory. These are the revenue  equivalence  hypothesis,  the competitiveness  hypothesis  and the
effect of uncertainty  on the auction-determined  rate.
5.1  Summary of results.
The variables for which theoretically  predicted effects could be assigned a priori are foreign
exchange  supply, demand, and the opportnity  cost (parallel or bureaux  exchange rate). The empirical
results  strongly  corroborate the theoretical  predictions  in that sustained  increased  foreign  exchange  supply
(demand)  leads to an equilibrium  auction  rate appreciation  (depreciation).  Also, the parallel/bureaux  rate
was positive and strongly significant,  representing an opportunity cost to bidders, but also signalling
incredibility  of macro-economic  policy (see also Aron and Elbadawi, 1994).  The model  also lends strong
support  to the error correction framework,  where the curient a&kction  rate is shown to adjust  to previous
departures  from equilibrium,  while  transitory movements  in the fundamentals  influenced  the auction  rate
in the short-run. Finally, dummy variables representing policy interventions in Nigeria, Uganda and
zambia were found to effect struucural  shifts in the long-run auction rate.
The revenue equivalence hypothesis was tested for Nigeria and Zambia, where episodes of
competitive  and Dutch auctions  followed consecutively.  In both cases evidence  was found against the
revenue-equivalence  hypothesis,  with the Dutch auction (strongly)  revenue-superior  in Nigeria, and the
competitive  auction (weakly)  dominating  in Zambia. The interpretation  of this result, however, is not
straightforward,  given that there is no theoretical result for repeated, multi-unit auctions. Theoretical
models  for more  restricted  auctions  suggest  several  reasons  for the result  of non-equivalence  (section  2.2).
A possible explanation  for revenue-superiority  of the competitive  auction is that bidders' private values
are correlated, with risk-neutral and symmetric  bidders (Weber, 1983). This result seems plausible for
Zambia, given that the bids were published  weekly for most of the auctions. A feasible explanation  for
Dutch-dominance  in the wholesale auction in  Nigeria is collusive behaviour by a  small number of
predominandy  state-owned  and risk-neutral  banks (Robinson, 1985).  To the extent that these results are
robust, this implies  that no revenue  advantage  can be assigned a priori to a repeated, multi-unit  auction,
irrespective  of the underlying valuation characteristics of bidders. Apart from the static analysis of
Tenorio (1993),  this hypothesis  has not been tested for repeated multi-unit  auctions using actual auction
data.
The impact of supply volatility (a proxy for uncertainty) on the level of the auction rate in
repeated auctions was tested for all four countries, controlling  for auction type, but was not found to
produce a risk-preniium on the auction-determined  rate in any country. In Ghana and Uganda, the use
of a reserve  price served  to stem  downward  volatility  in thin markets,  or where disqualification  for failing
to abide by documentation  requirements  reduced demand. Moreover, although the rule was not pre-- 24-
announced,  it was fairly transparent  to bidders, so that despite the higher supply volatility in Ghana and
Uganda relative to the other two countries, the exchange rate prescribed a fairly stable path. An
alternative  explanation is that bidders were risk neutral in these auctions. This result may apply for
Zambia (where no binding reserve price was used), and accords with the conclusions  above on revenue
equivalence.  On the contrary, for Nigeria, supply volatility was too litnited to have the expected  effect
because foreign exchange supply was used as target variable to stabilise the exchange rate (without
success).  However,  these results should not be taken  to imply that supply volatility  did not matter in these
auctions: in preliminary regressions (not reported here) we found supply volatility to be an important
determinant of exchange rate volatility. This would be a useful area for further research, with the
implication  that foreign  aid may ameliorate  supply  volatility  induced  by temporary  terms of trade shocks.
The role of competitiveness  effects in auctions  could  only be tested  for Nigeria. Our results show
that controlling  for policy intervention  and consequent  structural shifts which characterised  the Nigerian
auction, an increased  number of bidders lead to equilibrium  auction rate depreciation  in repeated, multi-
unit auctions.  This prediction  from auction theory for more restricted auctions, has been found to hold
in other types of one-shot, multi-unit  auctions  (McAffee  and McMillan, 1987).  However, this is the first
corroboration  of the theory for a repeated, multi-unit  auction.
5.2  Poicy lessons.
In broad. summary, these empirical results corroborate the distinction between two sets of
countries in terms of design features, auction policies and outcomes. 4 Ghana and Uganda represent a
set where auctions  have been largely on target in terms of the  ree policy objectives  of exchange  rate
unification,  stabilisation  of the exchange  rate and an efficient  allocation  of foreign exchange.  On the other
hand, the auctions in  Zambia and Nigeria were subject to  frequent policy interventions, with the
consequence  of unsustainable  auctions, inefficient  allocation  through ad hoc disqualifications  (at least in
Zambia), limited unification, and a  rather volatile exchange rate. A number of policy lessons for
exchange  rate reform in SSA can be distilled  from these results.
First, in large  measure, the failure to achieve  exchange  rate unification  and a stable exchange  rate
in Zambia  and Nigeria can be attributed  to the absence  of a reserve price rule. Our results suggest  that
use of a fairly predictable  reserve price stabilises  foreign exchange auctions, given the limited  depth of
SSA financial  markets.  The rule is learned by bidders, and diminishes  speculative  bidding."
a Furhermore,  othe  disftibutional  analysis  in acompanionpaper  (Aron  and Elbadawi, 1994)  also  ueda  clear distinction
between  the two sets of countries. For example, the distribution  of the auction rate exhibits  left skewness  (tendency  towards
appreciadon)  in Nigeria  and Zambia-  while  the opposite  was observed  for Ghana and Uganda.
"In principle,  a pre-announced  and stable supply  policy  rule could  achieve  a similar stbilising effecL However,  we have
shown  that in practice  the  endemic  potential  variability  of foreign  exchange  earnings  (excluding  aid)  in SSA, makes  it difficult
for an auctioneer  to guarantee  credibly  a stable  supply  in the medium-run.  Furiernore. a supply  rule does  not achieve  the close- 25 -
Second, the management  of a sustainable  and credible reserve price policy requires an efficient
secondary  market. The use of legalised  bureaux  markets  in Uganda and Ghana  had two advantages  in this
respect: they are likely to be deeper markets, and moreover  eliminate  the risk-premium  associated  with
illegality. Macro-economic  policy remains crucial to the success  of the reserve  pricing policy (Aron and
Elbadawi, 1994). A stable and consistent macro-economic  environment,  permitted the development  of
a stable and steadily depreciating bureaux rate in Ghana and Uganda, while the highly volatile illegal
parallel rate was not suitable as a guide for policy in Zambia  and Nigeria.
Thire, auction  rate depreciation  as a consequence  of increased  liberalisation  and hencecompetition
in the auctions, is consistent  with fundamental  market behaviour, and as such stabilises  the auction and
fosters long-term  unification.  This has been  the experience  of Ghana  and Uganda. In contrast  Nigeria and
Zambia  attempted  to stem depreciation  through increased  entry restrictions  (and ad hoc disqualifications)
over time: these policies back-fired and merely increased damaging speculative  behaviour. Given the
initial  conditions  of thin and rather rudimentary  financial  markets in SSA, there may be advantages  from
a more gradual liberalization  for allowing institution-building  and lea-ning by agents in the market  -
bidders, bureaux,  commercial  banks, and the auction managers  (Aron and Elbadawi, 1994).  Gradualism
may also be justified from a macro-perspective,  given the substantial macro-imbalances  and the low
credibility  that often characterise initial conditions  in reforming SSA countries.
Fourth, choosing Dutch over  competitive pricing does not  provide an  automatic revenue
advantage,  though it may where there are a small number  of bidders engaging  in strategic  behaviour, or
where risk-aversion  is paramount.  However, the Dutch auctiDon  may introduce  other undesirable  features
such as a reduced  pool of bidders and inefficiences  associated  with a multiple  rate system.
Fifth, while supply volatflity  - with supply announced  only just before  opening  the sealed  bids -
does not produce a risk-premium  on the level of the auction rate, there is preliminary  evidence that it
is important-for auction rate volatility. This finding bears further investigation, with the potential
implication  that stability  of foreign aid could play an important  role in compensating  for fluctuations  in
export earnings  induced  by trade shocks and/or natural disasters.
Sixth, although  we did not specifically  address the issue of allocation  in the auctions,  anecdotal
evidence suggests that efficiencyr  of allocation improved relative to the previous system of  manual
allocation  under a fixed rate. However, it is to be expected  that ad hoc disqualifications  as occurred in
Zambia diminished  these advantages.
Finally, the evidence from Ghana and Uganda as against Nigeria and Zambia, suggests the
paramount importance  of transparent policy rules and conduct  of the auctions. Lack of-transparency is
tantamount  to unnecessary  increased discretion by the auction managers, thus exacerbating  one of the
major potential weaknesses  of the auction regime.
linkage  with macropolicy evolution  and extrnal  aocks tha is imuediatel reflected  in a rerve  price based on a seconday
free market.-26 -
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TABLE  2:  Etnmation of the equilbrkmn auction rate for Zambia. Ugundei Ghan. and Nigeria.
ZAMBIA
Equation  1  Equation  2
utrAlo:
equlibrlum error  0.83976E01  0.95212EiO1
12.17241  12.23031
constant  0.28815  022150
10.340281  10.294711
0ogIaS),.,  -0.79092  -0.68865
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1-3.70271  (-3.64003
AlooCld),  0.31940E-01  0.34691 E-01
(2.0072.  (2.09543
AlogiberI,  0.60805  0.81353
(10.4512  (10.3791




log of likelihood function =  142.331  142.587
no. of observations - 64  64
SE  regression =  0.28766E-01  0.289250E-01
K-squared  - 0.754487  0.921638
edjusted R-squared  - 0.906852  0.905819
DW statistic  3  1.2347  1.2299
sum of squared residuais  3  0.438597E-01  0.435067E-O1
ADFI4i residual - 4.94  -4.99
CHOW  F(9.442  1.273191- 32 -
TABLE  2:  (Contd.l
NIGERIA
Equation 1  Equation  2
satad:
equilbrium error  0.55960  0.65928
(6.436S1  16.3630)
constmnt  0.26381  0.25274
10.803201  10.71291)
-0.17620  *0.17566
1-11.60601  1-1.581  51
lolO{d!,,,  0.19982  0.20074
(1.7649)  (1.74672
log(BEFR,.,  0.20691  0.15219
(2.29671  (1.59291
log(bidtl,..  0.1 5225  0.20950
11.61101  (2.19251
MAV 1Alog(qu2.,  ...  0.30276E-01
(0.89207E-01)
DUMDutdc  0.73946E-01  0.73533E-01
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(2.7757)  12.71  5SI
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dynamic:
AIog(Os),  -0.31 201  -0.31 179
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15.0387)  (4.98131
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12.2747)  (2.21  862
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(-2.3799)  (-2.1  2292
dgnostic:  (t-ststistics  in parentheses)
log of likelihood function  124.551  124.556
no. of observations  =  63  63
SE  regresion  - 03S389E-01  0.387926E-01
R-squared  0.754487  0.754529
adiusted  R-squared  =  0.6S2879  0.676187
DW statistic  - 2.0934  2.1039
sum of squared  residuals =  0.707408E-01  0.707289E-01
ADF141  residual  =  -4.47  -4.45
CHOW  Fl13.351 - 1.513739- 33 -
TAME 2:  (Contd.)
- ~~~~GHANA
Equation  1  Equation  2
equlilbrium  error  0.1 873BE-01  0.18B67E-01
14.37441  (4.33291
conatent  0.1B04B  0.11443
(0.244031  10.155801
log.s).,  - -0.31869  -0.30229
(-2.4983)  (-2.40011
klogadil,  0.86500  0.86011
14.2207)  14.17711
log(BEl`Q,,  0.77307  0.77751
M4.S9453  14.9073)
MAV (Alog(qel,.,  ...  0.91587E-01
10.77940)
dynamic:
AIog(CLsl,  -0.895111E-02  -0.87323E-02
I-4.50941  (-4.3784)
AMog(axL.,  -0.41 345E-02  *0.41  627E-02
(-2.42531  (-2.44573
AlaglOs),.,  0.5411 5E-02  0.55080E 02
(3.20451  (3.26471
Alog(Od),  0.17074E-01  0.17049E-01
18.98471  (8.94861
dlog(Od3,. 1 .0.3S971  E0  02  -0.40007E-02
1-2.6323)  (-2.6871)
AloglQdl . 0.35241 E-02  0.351 06E-02
(2.1075)  12.09841
AloglOQdi,,  -OA51  30E-02  -0.43208E-02
(-2.6181)  (-2.4807)
Alog(berl,  ...  04090SBE-01
,.  .(1.5777)
AlogIber),. 2 0.63480E01  0.65041E1-01
12.49153  (2.5533)
d':
ft-statirstcs  in perenthesesl
log of likelihood function  970.719  972.235
no. of obsarvdions  - 266  266
SE  regression - 0.645304E-02  0.64418SE02
RPquared =  0.459540  0.465665
adjusted R-squared  - 0.433905  0.435862
OW statisc  - 1.9582  1.9525
sum of squared  residudsl  0.105354E-01  0.104160E-01
ADF(41  residual - -6.25  -6.30
CHOW F1l3.2013  a  2.586580- 34 -
TABLE 2:  (Connd.l
UGANDA
Equaton 1  Equation  2
stati:
equilibrium  error  0.74353E-01  0.7501 0E01
14.4143)  (4.41421
constant  4.9556  4.9849
(5.82873  15.8731)
bolas)1 .,  -0.29391E-01  -0.282556E01
(-2499631  (-2.87081
loglOdl,.,  0.44105EE01  0.42668E-01
13.62131  (3.5095)
bogIBERI.,  0.27697  0.27292
12.3066)  12.2770)
MAV (Alog(q.ll,.,  ...  *0.38358E-05
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DUMguarantee  0.11474E-01  0.1 1360E-01
11.985969)  (1.9633)
dclnarnio:
Aiogial.  0.93263E-03  0.901164E-03
(2.2358)  12.1315)
Alog(quI,,  -0.59881  E-03  0.56979E-03
(3.2272)  12.95661
AlolodI.  -0.95845E-03  0.95213E-03
(2.97899  12.9376)
AIoo(01, 1 4-0.11450E-02  -0.11068E-02
(-2.399B)  1-2.28181
AlogIberl.  0.85835E-01  0.12322
(2.1438)  (3.08961




log of likelihood function  - 337.319  337.56D
no.  of observations  58  58
SE regressimn  - 0.809678E-03  0.81 5224E-03
R-squared  - 0.635630  0.B38651
adjustd  R-squared  =  0.54849  0.542291
DW  Bstaistic  1.8440  1.8867
sum of squared residuals . 0.301566E-04  0.299066E-04
ADOF41  residual - -3.54  -3.59
CHOW F1l11.351  1.098098- 35 -
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APPENDIX I: Econometric  methodology.
The main objective of this research is generating an asymptoticallv efficient
estimates for the equilibrium model of section 2.  The existence of cointegration readily
guaranteed consistent (in fact super-c)insistent)  estimation  for the equilibrium parameters
from a simple OLS regression of equation (1) above (Engle and Granger (1987)).  This
important property  has  been  the  main  reason  behind the  enormous  popularity of
cointegration regression in the past few years.  As pointed by  Phillips and Loreton
(1991), however, the cointegration regression usually produces substantially inefficient
arjmptotic estimations. Given our interest in generating  asymptotic  point estimators with
smaller margin of errors for the true equilibrium, the direct cointegration estimation will
not be adequate for the problem at hand.
Fortunately, Phillips and Loretan (1991) propose a useful empirical paradigm
based on statistical distribution  theory that can be used to generate asymptotically  efficient
estimation  in  the  context  of  single  equation  cointegration  (or  error-correction)
econometrics.  Phillips and Loretan show that asymptotic efficiency obtains in the case
of cointegration regression only for the fully modified  OLS (Phillips and Hansen (1990)-
with semiparametric serial correlation and endogeneity  corrections).  And in the case of
a  modified  non-linear  single  equation  error-correction  specification  (with  lagged
equilibrium relations and both lags and leads of AF, as regressors).  In what follows we
will discuss the modified ECM, since it will turn out to be a direct generalization  of the
ECM consistent long-run cointegration equilibrium.
Consider the following  typical cointegrated systems:  let Y. =  [e]  be an n-
vector with an I(1) process and  (&  = [']  be an n-vector stationary time series, with
n  =  m+ 1.  Now the cointegration equilibrium can be  represented by the following
systems (Phillips and Loretan (1991), Phillips (1991)):
e,= #IF  (1')I
AF,  =  L  (2')
a.a
As.suming  that,y 1 =  S  Aj  etj,  d0=[ E  j 1 r I Al || <  o,  where e-iid  N (O,  );  Philips
j.O  J-O
and  Loretan  (1991) show that  system  (1')  and (2')  is  equivalent to  the  following
expression:
et  =  'Ft  +4E  djj (e  -3'Ft)  +  d  BAF  j +  (3)2
i-I  j-o
Z  Phillips  and Lorctan (199  1) emphasize  the point that asymptotic  theory requires dhis  particular nonlinear formulation  of
the ECM, as opposed  to die other frequendy used formulation  in die literature based on using Ae;  instead  of (;i  - lB,  this
is because lags of Ae, are not in genral  an adequate  proxy for dte past history of pi,, because of die persistence in the effects
of the innovaiions  that arises  from die presence  of unit roots in the system.- 38 -
where  tj,  =  p,,  - Ep,,X 1.,)  is a Martingale difference sequence with respect to the
filtration  X,,  a  =(Ae 1 ,,Ae,_ 2... ,AFAFt-1....).  A  suitably truncated version  of (3)
above has been employed in single equation error correction (SEECM) empirical work
(e.g. Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg (1981)).
Phillips and Loretan (1991), however, show that a truncated version of (3) will
fail to produce asymptotically efficient estimators, because the truncation error is non-
negligible due to shock persistence.  Also Phillips (1988a) show that there is a general
failure of valid conditioning-a desirable feature in the Hendry-Richard metholoy;f -due
to the presence of feedback from A, to ga.  To rectify the failure of equation (3) to
produce asymptotically efficient estimators of 6l, Phillips and Loretan (1991) show that
this needs the elimination of this feedback, and they suggested including leads of AF, in
the regression of (3) so that in the limit p, is orthogonal to the entire history (AF 1)Z..
Their revised version of (3), therefore,.has the following fbrm.
C  a
et =  pPT  E  d, 1 (e,j - 6'F,j)  r  djAF_j
j-l  j-0
'E d/AF 1..,  v
where v,  =,  - r  d3 gZ 1 ,-jI  and is a martingale difference sequence with respect to the
.-.
filtration  p'--,  =  r  ,  t  *..t  (,uQA.
A truncation of (4) that will be estimated in this paper allows for two lags and
one lead (Phillips and Loretan (1991))t
=et  =IF  + d, 1(e.,  - Ft_,)  + d,n(et,,  - PT,-_)
: dAF  + d21'AF,-2 +  dAFt- 2 (5)
+ dX,AFt.[ + v,
a  The Hendry-Richard approach (see Gilbert, 1986) suggests that a  successfil single-equaton ECM should meet tde
following critemia:  (1) data coherency; (2) valid conditonian,  (3) encompassing; (4) theory compatibility; (5) parsimonious
orthogonal decision variables; (6) prameter  constncy.
The relative successful order (2, 1) truncated model simulated by Philips and Loretan (1991), however. contains only
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